Imperfect private monitoring in an infinitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors' behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game's history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truthtelling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The flow of information is related with network centrality measures. Abstract Imperfect private monitoring in an in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a communication network is studied. Players observe their direct neighbors'behavior only, but communicate strategically the repeated game's history throughout the network. The delay in receiving this information requires the players to be more patient to sustain the same level of cooperation as in a complete network, although a Folk Theorem obtains when the players are patient enough. All equilibria under exogenously imposed truthtelling extend to strategic communication, and additional ones arise due to richer communication. There are equilibria in which a player lies. The ‡ow of information is related with network centrality measures. JEL classi…cation numbers: C72, C73, D85
Introduction
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y Departamento de Economía, Edi…cio de Biblioteca (Entrada Este), Universidad de Navarra, 31080 Pamplona, Spain; email: mkinateder@unav.es Equilibrium in strictly dominant actions. However, this is not e¢ cient and all players bene…t from cooperation. This is achieved, and thus e¢ ciency attained, by repeating the Prisoner's Dilemma forever, provided the players are patient enough.
This paper analyzes an in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on a network. Kinateder (2008) de…nes repeated network games based on any stage game. All players in a connected and undirected network that is …xed throughout the repeated game participate in the same stage game at each point in time. A player only observes his neighbors' behavior. However, by communicating with them, he receives the entire history of the repeated game with a …nite delay. For patient players, a Folk Theorem obtains provided that they truthfully communicate their observations to their neighbors.
For the Prisoner's Dilemma additional results obtain, in particular, under strategic communication. All belief-free equilibria extend from exogenously imposed truthtelling to strategic communication and others exist due to richer communication. The players may lie, even in equilibrium, and imperfect private monitoring arises endogenously in this model. The information a player receives is a strategic choice of the other players.
In the literature, frequently, each player in a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma receives a distinct, exogenously determined and imperfect signal of each action pro…le played. 1 In the setup studied here, each player observes his neighbors perfectly, although the information they communicate him may contain lies. Hence, a slightly simpler version of belief-free equilibrium is used than in other imperfect monitoring models in which a player observes the repeated game's history with a vanishing " noise.
In case the players follow the trigger strategy pro…le, it is possible to relax the assumption of the network's connectedness and cooperation obtains if each group contains at least two players and they are patient enough.
The repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma is de…ned next. In section 3, the basic di¤erence between the complete and a star network each formed by three players which follow the trigger strategy is illustrated. 2 This result is extended to any connected network, and conditions are given under which it holds for unconnected networks. In section 4, results under strategic communication are given. Before concluding, the results are allocated to the literature and the informational setup in the network studied here is related to network centrality measures.
Preliminaries

Prisoner' s Dilemma Stage Game and Network
Each player i in the …nite set of players I = f1; :::; ng; where n > 2; has a set of pure actions A i = fC; Dg; C stands for cooperate and D for defect. The stage game's pure action space is A = i2I A i ; with generic element a; called pure action pro…le. To emphasize player i's role, a is written as (a i ; a i ): For any subset of players S I; let A S = i2S A i ; and denote by a S an element of this set. Player i's payo¤ function is a mapping h i : A ! R; and the payo¤ function h : A ! R n assigns a payo¤ vector to each pure action pro…le. Given a 2 A; player i's payo¤ function is The Prisoner's Dilemma stage game in normal form is the tuple G
Let the convex hull of the …nite set of payo¤ vectors corresponding to pure action pro…les in G be co(G) = cofx 2 R n j 9 a 2 A : h(a) = xg:
The players in set I are vertices of a network g; whose graph is de…ned as (I; E); where E I I denotes the set of links between them. A link from player i to player j is denoted by (i; j): Graph (I; E) is undirected, that is, for all i; j 2 I; (i; j) 2 E if, and only if, (j; i) 2 E: Given network g; a path between two distinct players i and j is de…ned as a sequence of distinct players i 1 ; :::; i r with i 1 = i; i r = j; and (i l 1 ; i l ) 2 E; for all 1 < l r: Its length is r 1: Let network g be connected, that is, each player is connected to at least one other player directly and to all others via paths of …nite lengths. The length of the shortest path between two distinct players i and j is called distance between i and j: It is denoted by d ij : The largest distance (along shortest paths) between player i and any other player in g is de…ned by d i = max j2I d ij ; and network g's diameter is the maximal largest distance among all players, that is, d = max i2I d i : Finally, denote player i's set of direct neighbors by i(1) = fj 2 I j d ij = 1g; and for any 2 m d i ; de…ne his set of m-neighbors as i(m) = fj 2 I j d ij = mg:
Communication and Observations
When the Prisoner's Dilemma is played repeatedly, in each period, a player …rst chooses an action, in a way speci…ed below, and then makes observations and communicates with his neighbors. At any t 1; let player i's set of observations be Ob t i : It includes all possible observations that i may make at t of the actions chosen by his direct neighbors and the information they observed one period earlier which they communicate him strategically. At any t 1; let player i's observation be ob t i 2 Ob t i ; and denote the observation pro…le by ob t 2 Ob t ; where Ob t = i2I Ob t i : At any t > 1; player i sends a report r t i from his set of reports R t i ; to be de…ned later, to all neighbors in i(1): He reports the information he received at t 1 in a strategic way, that is, possibly lying. Given ob t 1 i ; player i lies at t if his report r t i di¤ers from ob t 1 i as follows: he changes the action a s j 2 ob t 1 i ; abusing notation, chosen by some player j at some 1 s < t to any other action b j 2 A j n fa j g: He reports all other observations in ob t 1 i truthfully to his neighbors. Apart from his report, i's neighbors also observe his action choice at t:
Observations and reports evolve as follows. At t = 1; Ob 1 i = A i A i(1) ; that is, player i observes what he and all his neighbors do, while R 1 i = ; since i has no previous information to report. At the end of t = 2; player i reports to any neighbor in i(1) what he observed that all his neighbors did at t = 1: Formally, R 2 i = A i(1) = Ob 1 i n A i since a player never reports what he did, unless this is part of a report he received from a neighbor. At t = 2; player i observes what his neighbors do and receives their reports, that is,
In this way, a recursive dynamic process of observations and reports is generated, and at any t > 1; R t i = Ob t 1 i n A i and Ob t i = A i A i(1) j2i(1) R t j : 3 Information ‡ows one link per period, and at t = d i ; player i for the …rst time receives a …ltered version of what the most distant player from him did at t = 1: It is …ltered by the players located on the shortest path between him and the player at distance d i from him. However, links are not only counted along shortest paths, but a link is used several times on any path (for example, any piece of information ‡ows back and forth between two neighbors). Hence, a player's observations and reports grow in size over time since he receives one report from any neighbor and hands it over to all neighbors (including the one from which he received it) in the subsequent period.
The players have perfect recall, and player i's set of private histories at the end of period t is denoted by H t i = [ t s=1 Ob s i : The private history he observed at the end of t is thus [ t s=1 ob s i : The players organized in this way play an in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma.
Repeated Prisoner' s Dilemma Played on a Network
In the in…nitely repeated discounted Prisoner's Dilemma played on …xed network g; thereafter called repeated network (Prisoner's Dilemma) game, at each point in discrete time, t = 1; 2; :::; the Prisoner's Dilemma stage game G is played.
Let player i's set of strategies be F i = fff t i g 1 t=1 j f 1 i 2 A i ; and for all t > 1; f t i : H t 1 i ! A i g: At any t 1; player i's strategy f i = ff t i g 1 t=1 prescribes him to choose an action. For t > 1; it maps his set of private histories to his action set. Let F = i2I F i be the repeated network game's strategy space and let strategy pro…le f = (f 1 ; :::; f n ) be an element of F: Let player i's set of communication strategies be Com i = ffcom t i g 1 t=1 j com 1 i = ;; and for all t > 1; com t i :
prescribes him to send a report to all his neighbors at any t > 1: It maps his set of private histories to his report set. Let Com = i2I Com i be the repeated network game's communication space and let communication pro…le com = (com 1 ; :::; com n ) be an element of Com: To emphasize player i's role, f is written as (f i ; f i ) and com as (com i ; com i ): Let F Com be the strategy and communication space of the repeated network game. At any t 1; each pair (f; com) 2 F Com recursively generates a pure action pro…le a t (f; com) = (a t 1 (f; com); :::; a t n (f; com)); a report pro…le r t (f; com) = (r t 1 (f; com); :::; r t n (f; com)) and a corresponding observation pro…le ob t (f; com) = (ob t 1 (f; com); :::; ob t n (f; com)): These determine the action and report pro…les at t + 1: If truthtelling is assumed or arises endogenously under strategic communication, player i only selects a strategy while his communication is determined as follows: at any t > 1;
to R t i is the identity. The players then hand over the repeated network game's true history.
Given a common discount factor 2 [0; 1); the function H : F Com ! R n assigns a payo¤ vector to each strategy and communication pro…le of the repeated network game.
is the (1 )-normalized discounted sum of stage game payo¤s. Given and g; the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma is de…ned as the normal form game G g;
The players commonly know the game played, the network and the strategy choices available to all players, and importantly, observe their payo¤ only at the end of the game. 4 The discount factor is then interpreted as the probability with which the Prisoner's Dilemma is played again in the next period. The probability that the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma ended by period T converges to 1 as T goes to in…nity.
Individual Rationality and Belief-free Equilibrium
A player's individually rational payo¤ is the lowest to which he can be forced in a stage game. It obtains when he maximizes his payo¤ while all other players minimize it and is called minmax payo¤. For any player i 2 I; let his minmax payo¤ in pure actions be
(1)
In the Prisoner's Dilemma, for any player the individually rational payo¤ is 1. It obtains when all players choose D: This is the unique stage game Nash Equilibrium in pure and strictly dominant actions. Denote by = (1; :::; 1) the minmax payo¤ vector.
The set of feasible payo¤ vectors of the repeated network game is de…ned as
Any feasible payo¤ vector can be generated by a sequence of pure action pro…les. 5 The set of feasible and individually rational payo¤ vectors is denoted by F : It contains all feasible payo¤ vectors that are larger than or equal to ; and is de…ned as
Any payo¤ vector in this set is a candidate to be supported by a belief-free equilibrium. In a belief-free equilibrium, each player conditions his action and report choices only on his observations. His strategy is a best-reply to the other players' strategies given his private history but not the other players'private histories. For a formal de…nition of BF E see Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005) . In contrast to them, belief-freeness in this model arises not because the players are indi¤erent between choosing C and D; but rather since their action and report choices are only conditional on their observations. Moreover, these observations are precise and not only made with probability (1 "):
The set of BF E strategy pro…les is denoted by BF E(G g; ): If truthtelling is imposed exogenously BF E ET (G g; ) is adored with superscript ET for exogenous truthtelling. A strategy pro…le is a BF E if, and only if, no player's …nite unilateral deviation at any point in time is pro…table. 6
3 The Network makes a di¤erence
The following example of the Prisoner's Dilemma with three players and exogenously imposed truthtelling, denoted byĉom 2 Com; illustrates how imposing a network on a set of players a¤ects the set of BF E: Consider the trigger strategy pro…le. It prescribes each player to cooperate as long as all players cooperate and to defect forever if any player defected. Given any network g; the trigger strategy of player i; denoted byf i 2 F i ; is de…ned as follows:f 1 i = C; and for t 1;
Given (f ;ĉom) 2 F Com; for all i 2 I and all t 1; …rst a t i (f ;ĉom) = C; and second, for all a j 2 ob t i (f ;ĉom); a j = C as well for all 1 t and all j 2 I: Hence, for all i 2 I;
The Players form a Star
Consider a star (or a line) with n = 3; as represented in Figure 1 . The graph of g is E = ((1; 2); (2; 1); (2; 3); (3; 2)): Figure 2 represents G for n = 3; where player 1 chooses rows, player 2 columns and player 3 matrices. The trigger strategy pro…le is a BF E of A BF E does not impose restrictions on play after a multilateral deviation by two or more players. Any unilateral deviation that may arise can be uniquely allocated to one of the following three classes:
1) initial unilateral deviations, 2) subsequent unilateral deviations (before the initial is known by all players), and 3) unilateral deviations when the punishment takes place.
Obviously, unilateral deviations during the punishment are not pro…table since all players choose D: The resulting action pro…le is the stage game Nash Equilibrium in strictly dominant actions. Hence, every player best-replies independently of g and of :
For the same reason, no player can deviate pro…tably from the trigger strategy pro…le in class 2. After a player's initial deviation, he and any player who knows about it are best-o¤ to play D forever (rather than to deviate and to choose C at any point in time).
It remains to show that no player has a pro…table unilateral deviation from the trigger strategy pro…le when all players choose C: Given ; player 2 (who is directly observed by 1 and 3) does not deviate in any period if, and only if,
The value of 1 3 is not only the threshold value for player 2 in this example but also the one for all players in a complete network. The network a¤ects, however, the threshold value of the remaining two players in this example. Given ; player 1 (and similarly 3) does not deviate from the trigger strategy pro…le in any period if, and only if,
(1 ) + (1 )
which simpli…es to 2 + 2 1 0: The only positive solution for in this quadratic equation is 0:414: Hence, in class 1 of the BF E conditions the requirement on ; or the players'patience, is higher in the three players star network than in a complete one due to the one period lag with which players 1 and 3 observe each other's action choice.
This example extends to any star network where n > 3: The player at the center of the star has the same role as player 2 in this example, and for all other players the same conditions apply as for players 1 and 3 in this example.
The Repeated Prisoner' s Dilemma Played in any Network
A similar result holds for any network (with n > 3); in which all players follow the trigger strategy. In Figure 1 it takes 2 periods until full punishment sets in. In any network, it takes d i periods until all players punish player i: The group of punishers increases strictly until d i periods after i's deviation. Until then the deviator's payo¤ is 2 since at least one player still chooses C: Thereafter, it is 1 forever.
Since the diameter d is the maximal largest distance among all players, for any network g; there is a discount factor that solves 2 + d 1 0 such that no player in the network deviates from the trigger strategy pro…le. Hence, for this strategy pro…le it is possible to classify all networks that can be formed from the set of players according to their diameter. The threshold value of the discount factor ; for which no player deviates from the trigger strategy pro…le, that is, the level of patience required to sustain cooperation is non-decreasing in the network's diameter d: Intuitively, a higher diameter implies that information between at least one pair of players travels over a longer distance.
Although the expression 2 + d 1 0 depends on d; even in large networks the threshold value for is bounded above by 1 2 : To see this, take the limit of the inequality when d converges to in…nity. Since < 1; the term d converges to 0 and the inequality simpli…es to 1 2 : Hence, for "moderately patient" players, the trigger strategy pro…le is a BF E in any repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma.
The Network is Unconnected
Network g is unconnected if there are di¤erent connected and undirected components. Suppose that each component contains at least two players. Together all components constitute network g: All players in a component observe each other and communicate with each other. They never observe any player in another component nor do they receive reports about their action choices-the distance between any pair of unconnected players is normalized to in…nity. However, all players (in the di¤erent components) still participate in a single Prisoner's Dilemma game at every point in time.
Suppose that all players in the distinct components follow a modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le. Any player's unilateral deviation is only punished by the players in the component, since no other player ever observes it, although it a¤ects any other player's payo¤. The players (in his component) who observe the deviation choose D forever (possibly after some delay). This is a BF E if, and only if,
(1 )
(1 ) ;
1 2 :
This result shows that for moderately patient players cooperation is a BF E even if a player never observes the actions chosen by some other participants of the game. It also holds under strategic communication as follows from Theorem 1 in section 4 and even if the number of players becomes arbitrarily large. Although the value of 1 2 crucially depends on the parameter choice in the Prisoner's Dilemma in Figure 2 , identical qualitative results would arise in a parameterized Prisoner's Dilemma game.
Strategic Communication
In this section, the Prisoner's Dilemma played on any network is extended to strategic communication. This is challenging due to the bilateral communication structure. To illustrate some of the encountered di¢ culties, …rst an example is provided. Then, the trigger strategy and truthtelling are shown to be a BF E under strategic communication. From this two corollaries follow. Finally, a BF E with richer than truthful communication is derived and a Folk Theorem is established.
Given any observation pro…le, unilateral deviations from the strategy, from the communication and from both have to be shown to be unpro…table. In particular, deviations from the communication pro…le under truthtelling, that is, lies have to be dealt with. Two kinds of lies may occur. A player claims that there was a deviation when there was none or he does not reveal a deviation and neither punishes it.
Example 1 illustrates the situation in which lying is most di¢ cult to prevent since one player, called monitored player, has only one monitor.
Example 1. Suppose that the players are asked to tell the truth and to punish any deviation from the strategy or communication. In this case, the monitor, after observing a deviation of the monitored player is asked to report and to punish it. Does he have an incentive to lie, by not revealing it, and to deviate simultaneously by not punishing it?
Suppose that the monitor lies and continues to follow the sequence of action pro…les as if the deviation had not occurred. Then, the monitor is the last deviator and the monitored player, observing the monitor's deviation, starts to punish him. Thus, in equilibrium, the monitor is better o¤ to start punishment of the monitored player and to report the deviation truthfully. In case the monitor and the monitored player deviated together, and instead of starting punishment continue to play the initially prescribed sequence of action pro…les, then this is a multilateral deviation which is ignored in a BF E: Henceforth, in a BF E; the monitor reports the monitored player's deviation truthfully.
The trigger strategy and truthtelling are a BF E under strategic communication as is shown in Theorem 1. In this case, a deviation from the communication pro…le is a lie. Proof. Suppose that (f ;ĉom) 2 BF E ET (G g; ): Then, unilaterally choosing a di¤erent action than prescribed byf after any history, even if it includes lies, is not pro…table for any player since (f ;ĉom) 2 BF E ET (G g; ):
Next it is shown that a lie and deviation are unpro…table given any observation pro…le. Three cases might occur. First, no player has yet chosen D: If a player nevertheless claims that some other chose D; he starts punishment and chooses D: He lies and deviates sincê f prescribes him to choose C: Punishment starts as if the player who lied had deviated himself. Since he cannot deviate pro…tably, he neither can lie and deviate pro…tably.
Suppose next that at least one player has chosen D already. Any player who observed this should choose D to punish the deviator. If a player lies and claims that there was no deviation and deviates by choosing C instead of D; as prescribed byf ; he is worse o¤ since at least the deviator chooses D byf : Finally, suppose that all players choose D: Then, all of them are indi¤erent to tell the truth or not since to claim that any player chose C instead of D; even if this were true, does not change the sequence of action pro…les played. To lie and to choose C; in this case, is neither pro…table.
Finally, no player's lie is pro…table given any observation pro…le. A player is indi¤erent to reveal a deviation from C to D: If he does not reveal it, but still punishes it by choosing D he starts punishment anyway. Similarly, if he observes a deviation from D to C; he is indi¤erent to reveal it since anyway punishment started and he continues to choose D: Hence, lies (without deviation from the strategy) do neither occur after any history which already includes a sequence of deviations and/or lies.
Suppose that (f ;ĉom) 2 BF E(G g; ): Then, no player ever deviates from fa t (f ;ĉom); r t (f ;ĉom)g 1 t=1 ; and neither if truthtelling is imposed exogenously.
If the players in any network follow the trigger strategy pro…le and 1 2 ; as shown in section 3.2, no player ever deviates from the strategy or communication pro…le or from both, and truthtelling arises endogenously. For some networks, this result holds even for values of 2 ( 1 3 ; 1 2 ): By the threat of trigger punishment, it is possible to sustain other sequences of action pro…les under strategic communication as BF E: Let f denote the strategy pro…le which prescribes for any sequence of action pro…les fa t g 1 t=1 a conversion to D forever after observing any inconsistency in the strategy or communication. Given f andĉom; if is large enough, no player ever deviates or lies, that is, truthtelling arises endogenously under strategic communication and ( f ;ĉom) is a BF E: This is stated formally in Corollary 1.
Corollary 1. Let G; g; x 2 F and ( f ;ĉom) 2 F Com be given. Then, there is 2 [0; 1) such that for all 2 ( ; 1); there is f a t g 1 t=1 such that fa t ( f )g 1 t=1 f a t g 1 t=1 ; x i = H i ( f ;ĉom) for all i 2 I; and ( f ;ĉom) 2 BF E ET (G g; ) if, and only if, ( f ;ĉom) 2 BF E(G g; ):
The proof of this corollary is straightforward. It combines arguments from the proof of Theorem 1 with mathematical calculations analogous to that in section 3.
That, after observing a deviation, all players choose D; at least for some time, is a powerful threat. Partly, since it is not required to know the deviator's name but only that a deviation occurred. As long as a player identi…es a deviation he can punish it and another corollary follows immediately.
Corollary 2. Let G; g; (f;ĉom) 2 F Com and 2 [0; 1) be given. Then, (f;ĉom) 2 BF E ET (G g; ) if, and only if, (f;ĉom) 2 BF E(G g; ):
Corollary 2's proof is analogous to that of Theorem 1: If (f;ĉom) are a BF E under exogenously imposed truthtelling, then unilateral deviations are neither pro…table under strategic communication.
However, under strategic communication some player's lie may be part of a BF E; and thus the set of BF E under strategic communication is not a subset of that under truthtelling. Suppose that a player is prescribed not to report certain observations which would trigger punishment by some players. Any network in which one player has only one monitor is prone to this kind of equilibrium, as is shown in Theorem 2.
Theorem 2. Let G; 2 ( 2 3 ; 1) and g be given such that one player in g has only one monitor. Then, there is (f; com) 2 BF E(G g; ) such that (f; com) = 2 BF E ET (G g; ):
Proof. Let g be such that one player, called monitored player, is only connected to his monitor. Let f be a modi…ed trigger strategy pro…le: each player chooses C at any t; and D forever after observing any player having unilaterally chosen D or after observing any inconsistent report. The monitor and the monitored player's strategy is identical, except of the monitored player who is prescribed to choose D at t = 1000; and both, the monitor and the monitored player, ignore this observation of D and continue with the initially prescribed sequence of action pro…les. Moreover, com prescribes all players to report truthfully any observation they made, except of the monitor. He reports the monitored player's action choice in any other period than 1000 truthfully. At t = 1001; he reports that the monitored player chose C in the previous period. The monitor and the monitored player do not punish this lie, though they punish any other lie they identify. All other players punish any lie they observe by converting to D forever.
Then, for 2 ( 2 3 ; 1); as is easily veri…ed, (f; com) 2 BF E(G g; ); but (f; com) = 2 BF E ET (G g; ) since under com the monitor is prescribed to lie.
Even under exogenously imposed truthtelling, (f;ĉom) = 2 BF E ET (G g; ): Given (f;ĉom); the monitor truthfully reports the monitored player's choice in every period.
The other players anticipate the monitored player's choice of D in period 1000 and it is commonly known that cooperation breaks down in this period. As in any …nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with perfect monitoring, cooperation then is unsustainable from the beginning on. An interesting feature of this result is that the players prefer to be lied to, rather than to receive the unpleasant truth of the monitored player's choice of D: Although it is common knowledge that the monitored player chooses D in period 1000, 7 all players except of the monitor and the monitored player never observe this choice of D and are better o¤ to follow their strategy which is not conditioned on the common knowledge of the monitored player's choice of D: In equilibrium, a player can permit himself to stand on a high moral ground and threatens to punish any player's choice of D since he is sure never to receive an observation after which he would have to carry out his threat. In case the monitor were to communicate his knowledge of the monitored player's choice of D throughout the network, …rst this would not be a BF E; and second, the players in this case would want to jointly adopt the monitor and the monitored player's strategy of not punishing it.
The following corollary states formally that under strategic communication additional BF E arise compared with exogenously imposed truthtelling. Finally, it is possible to establish a Folk Theorem for the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma under strategic communication, that is, every feasible and strictly individually rational payo¤ vector can be supported by a BF E strategy and communication pro…le if the players are patient enough. This corollary is a consequence of Corollaries 1 and 2.
Corollary 4. Let G and g be given. Then, for all x 2 F ; there is~ < 1 such that for each 2 (~ ; 1); there are (f ;com) 2 F Com such that (f ;com) 2 BF E(G g; ) and
H (f ;com) = x: 5 Final Remarks
Related Literature
In the repeated games literature, there are di¤erent approaches to model imperfect private monitoring in an in…nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. Usually, the imperfection of the monitoring technology is imposed exogenously and limit results are given when it vanishes. Several papers in a special edition of the Journal of Economic Theory in 2002 provide corresponding results. Bhaskar and Obara (2002) and Sekiguchi (1997) analyze beliefbased sequential equilibria, while Ely and Välimäki (2002) and Piccione (2002) study BF E in which the players that participate in an in…nitely repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with imperfect private monitoring are indi¤erent between choosing C and D at any point in time.
The model studied here is using a simpler version of BF E: A player need not form beliefs about the history of his opponents since his observations are precise and not only made with probability (1 "): Belief-freeness arises since the players condition their strategy only on their observations, while in Ely, Hörner and Olszewski (2005) and in the above mentioned papers the players have to be indi¤erent among di¤erent actions in order to achieve it. Imperfect private monitoring in the repeated network Prisoner's Dilemma is not caused by an exogenously imposed monitoring technology, but rather by the players' strategic decisions.
Strategic communication in networks can be modelled in various ways. 8 The approach taken in this paper also relates to the literature on communication in repeated games. 9 Few papers combine both ideas. Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) study sequential equilibria of in…nitely repeated discounted games in which the players form a (not necessarily connected) network. The players publicly announce their own action choices and observations made about their neighbors in a strategic way, that is, including lies. When each group contains three or more players unilateral deviations are detectable, and hence, do not occur in equilibrium. In Ben-Porath and Kahneman (2003) monitoring, moreover, is costly. Thus, only one monitor is assigned to every player. After an incompatible announcement, which in equilibrium does not occur, both players are punished and the monitor is substituted. In comparison to both papers, the network in this paper is connected, though as seen in section 3.3, the trigger strategy is a BF E also in unconnected networks, as long as each component of the network contains at least two players.
The most central or best informed Player
There are two ways to identify the most central or best informed player. Depending on the communication pro…le one or both determine this player's location.
Under exogenously imposed truthtelling, the most central player is the one whose largest distance is smallest. He is …rst informed about all other players'action choices at some point in time. The second concept is Bonacich centrality, as de…ned by Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) . Roughly, it counts the number of paths of di¤erent length which start in any player i 2 I; weighted by the discount factor : The player from which more paths stem is most central. Under strategic communication, he receives the most information which includes what his neighbors tell him that he told them that they told him and so on. His informational advantage might be of quantitative rather than qualitative nature. Moreover, the other players in the network accumulate more information about him than about any other player.
Under truthtelling only largest distances matter while under strategic communication both concepts are important. Bonacich centrality identi…es the player with more information and largest distances the one who …rst receives (possibly wrong) information about all other players'action choices. Ballester, Calvó-Armengol and Zenou (2006) show that both concepts do not coincide, and usually identify di¤erent players as being most central.
Conclusion
Although the Prisoner's Dilemma is a well-studied game, there are still new results to explore. This paper studies the imposition of a communication network on a set of impatient players in the repeated Prisoner's Dilemma. The players'level of patience required to sustain the trigger strategy pro…le as a BF E is larger even in a simple three players star network compared with a complete one. For su¢ ciently patient players, the trigger strategy pro…le is a BF E in unconnected networks and under strategic communication.
Any BF E under exogenously imposed truthtelling is also a BF E under strategic communication when the players are prescribed to tell the truth. New BF E arise due to richer communication and the set of BF E under strategic communication is not a subset of that under exogenously imposed truthtelling.
That some player's lie-from which all players bene…t-is part of a BF E; is a feature frequently observed in reality. In many societies or groups, the existence of "misdeeds" or "skeletons in the cupboard" is well-known, though no action is taken as long as these are not observed publicly. The agent who withholds corresponding information has the same role as the monitor in Theorem 2.
The results obtained in this paper readily extend to directed networks and to observation and communication structures in which information does not ‡ow one link per period, for example, since every player takes a di¤erent amount of time to process information.
The model is not presented in mixed actions since a player cannot be forced to a lower minmax payo¤ using mixed actions, and since all feasible and strictly individually rational payo¤ vectors can be generated by sequences of pure action pro…les.
